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The Chicago School of antitrust has benefitted from a great deal of law oﬃce
history, written by admiring advocates rather than more dispassionate observers. This
essay attempts a more neutral examination of the ideology, political impulses, and
economics that produced the School and that account for its durability.
The origins of the Chicago School lie in a strong commitment to libertarianism
and nonintervention. Economic models of perfect competition best suited these goals.
† James G. Dinan University Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School and The
Wharton School. Thanks to Dennis Carlton, Gerald R Faulhaber, and Erik Hovenkamp for comments.
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The early strength of the Chicago School was that it provided simple, convincing
answers to everything that was wrong with antitrust policy in the 1960s, when
antitrust was characterized by over-enforcement, poor quality economics or none at
all, and many internal contradictions.
The Chicago School’s greatest weakness is that it did not keep up. Its leading
advocates either spurned or ignored important developments in economics that gave
a better accounting of an economy that was increasingly characterized by significant
product diﬀerentiation, rapid innovation, networking, and strategic behavior. The
Chicago School’s protest that newer models of the economy lacked testability lost its
credibility as industrial economics experienced an empirical renaissance, nearly all of
it based on models of imperfect competition.
What kept Chicago alive was the financial support of firms and others who stood
to profit from less intervention. Properly designed antitrust enforcement is a public
good. Its beneficiaries—consumers—are individually small, numerous, scattered, and
diverse. Those who stand to profit from nonintervention were fewer in number,
individually much more powerful, and much more united in their message. As a
result, the Chicago School went from being a model of enlightened economic policy to
an economically outdated but nevertheless powerful tool of regulatory capture.
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INTRODUCTION
The Chicago School has had an important place in antitrust analysis since
the 1960s. While its inﬂuence has waned considerably among scholars, it
continues to ﬁnd support among conservatives in business, politics, and the
federal judiciary. This Article attempts to put some historical perspective on
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the Chicago School, focusing on its ideology as well as its microeconomic and
legal antitrust analysis.
One well-known account of the Chicago School’s development is a panel
discussion edited by Ed Kitch of the University of Virginia in a program
honoring Aaron Director and Ronald Coase.1 His article bore the revivalistic
title “The Fire of Truth,” and it spoke of a religious movement, of people who
“gathered to bear witness” to a remarkable event.2
Kitch attempted to locate the roots of the Chicago School in the rise of
Legal Realism in the 1920s, with its eﬀorts to examine how the law actually
operates, rather than focusing purely on legal doctrine.3 It was an
unpromising comparison, as Kitch himself apparently realized.4 Alternative
accounts have found more plausible origins for the Chicago School of analysis
in the thought of Friedrich Hayek or Frank Knight.5 Kitch did properly fault
the Legal Realists for compiling a great deal of observation with very little
unifying theory or methodology.6 Kitch’s account is also notable for what it
omitted. There was no mention of Robert L. Hale, the pioneering Columbia
law and economics scholar who wrote about the relationship between
economics and the legal system.7 Nor did he mention Walton Hamilton’s
inﬂuential 1929 article in the American Economic Review, entitled Law and
Economics, which ﬁrst gave that discipline a name and attempted to set it on
a more institutional path.8 Another commentator made a single but
uninformative mention of Thurman Arnold,9 the Legal Realist who in 1938
became head of the Antitrust Division and became that Agency’s most
1 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago,
1932-1970, 26 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1983).
2 Id. at 163. William E. Kovacic also comments on the religious fervor. See William E. Kovacic,
The Chicago Obsession in the Interpretation of US Antitrust History, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 459, 459, 461 &
n.5, 462 (2020) (“[T]he Chicago School’s leading ﬁgures and their followers are portrayed as
ideological extremists, religious zealots, cult-like fanatics, or carriers of a disease.”).
3 Kitch, supra note 1, at 164-65.
4 Id. at 165.
5 See Rob Van Horn & Philip Mirowski, The Rise of the Chicago School of Economics and the Birth
of Neoliberalism, in THE ROAD FROM MONT PÈLERIN 139, 140 (Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe
eds., Harvard Univ. Press paperback ed. 2015) (recognizing that the traditional view on the origins
of the Chicago School often diminishes or neglects the importance of ﬁgures like Frank Knight and
Friedrich Hayek).
6 Kitch, supra note 1, at 164-65.
7 See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI.
Q. 470, 470 (1923) (noting that because “statesmen cannot avoid interfering with economic matters,”
“[t]here is accordingly a need for the development of economic and legal theory to guide them in
the process”).
8 See Walton L. Hamilton, Law and Economics, 19 AM. ECON. REV. 56 (1929); see also
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW 121 (2015) (discussing Hamilton’s
institutional view); id. at 364 n.16 (collecting sources).
9 Kitch, supra note 1, at 174.
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aggressive antitrust enforcer.10 Chicago, if anything, became the antiThurman Arnold.
Also missing from Kitch’s discussion was the single most important
question that divided the Chicago School from most of its alternatives, the
Legal Realists in particular: are markets similar, or do they diﬀer from one
another in fundamental ways? That issue sharply separated the Chicago
(“similar”) and Harvard (“diﬀer”) School approaches to industrial
organization economics and antitrust policy. The residue of that division,
which remains to this day, showed up in numerous ways. One was Chicago
economists’ and later lawyers’ hostility toward the antitrust enforcement
implications of both oligopoly theory and monopolistic competition theory.11
Another was Chicago’s narrow view of market failure and thus of the
appropriate scope of public intervention, such as Pigouvian taxes12 or price
regulation.13 Yet another was its continued eﬀorts to de-emphasize the
signiﬁcance of market structure in both regulatory and antitrust
decisionmaking. Chicago economist George Stigler devoted considerable
intellectual capital to both criticizing the theory of monopolistic
competition14 and weakening the theory of oligopoly so as to make it no more
than a special case of collusion.15 This came through loudly in the
popularizing scholarship of Robert Bork, who viewed oligopoly as something

10 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8 at 200-01 (describing Arnold’s pursuit of patent abuse cases).
See generally Spencer Weber Waller, The Antitrust Legacy of Thurman Arnold, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
569 (2004).
11 “Monopolistic competition” is often used as a shorthand for all cases of imperfect
competition that are not monopoly. On Chicago School scholar Robert H. Bork’s attitudes toward
oligopoly and monopolistic competition, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Whatever Did Happen to the
Antitrust Movement?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 583, 612 (2018), which describes Bork’s
antistructuralist view that “virtually denied the existence of oligopoly or any other problematic form
of market structure other than single-ﬁrm monopoly or express collusion.”
12 See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, J.L. & ECON. 1, 28-42 (1960) (critiquing
Pigou’s book The Economics of Welfare); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 104-05 (discussing the
history of Pigouvian taxes and their treatment by the Supreme Court).
13 See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3, 6 (1971) (discussing public policies related to price controls).
14 GEORGE J. STIGLER, Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect, in THE ORGANIZATION OF
INDUSTRY 309, 309-21 (1968) (criticizing Edward Chamberlin’s theory of monopolistic
competition); see also CRAIG FREEDMAN, The Chicago School of Anti-Monopolistic Competition:
Stigler’s Scorched Earth Campaign Against Chamberlin, in IN SEARCH OF THE TWO-HANDED
ECONOMIST 165, 165-342 (2016) (analyzing the motives and methods behind Stigler’s pointed
critique of Chamberlin’s theory).
15 See George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 47-48 (1964).
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that existed only in economics textbooks16 and who completely ignored the
theory of monopolistic competition.17
Imperfect competition theories threatened the core commitment to
nonintervention in Chicago School work. Joseph Schumpeter was prescient
in his 1934 review of Joan Robinson’s The Economics of Imperfect Competition.18
If her work were to be taken seriously, he wrote, it would completely
undermine the strong presumption against intervention.19 Rather, the
circumstances under which governmental action could increase welfare
“becomes so extended as to make these cases the rule rather than more or less
curious exceptions.”20 Built into Chicago School doctrine was a strong
presumption that markets work themselves pure without any assistance from
government. By contrast, imperfect competition models gave more equal
weight to competitive and noncompetitive explanations for economic
behavior.
The rejection of inconvenient advances in economics became a hallmark
of Chicago School analysis. Its followers were libertarians who were
committed on ideological grounds to less intervention by the state. The
classical liberal Mont Pelerin Society claimed not only Friedrich Hayek and
Frank Knight among its founding members, but also George Stigler, Aaron
Director, Fritz Machlup, Milton Friedman, James M. Buchanan, and Gary
Becker.21 Many of them were also economists, however, and they liked
competitive markets. Of course, an ideological commitment to
nonenforcement and a desire for competitive markets can come into tension
16 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 221 (1978); see Hovenkamp, supra note 11,
at 612 (discussing Bork’s “serious doubts that oligopoly behavior existed except in economics textbooks”).
17 See Richard S. Markovits, Monopolistic Competition, Second Best, and The Antitrust Paradox:
A Review Article, 77 MICH. L. REV. 567, 594 (1979) (book review) (examining the implications of
“Bork’s failure to deal with monopolistic competition”).
18 See Joseph A. Schumpeter & A.J. Nichol, Robinson’s Economics of Imperfect Competition, 42 J.
POL. ECON. 249 (1934) (reviewing JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT
COMPETITION (1933)).
19 Id. at 250-51.
20 Id. at 251.
21 See ANGUS BURGIN, THE GREAT PERSUASION 25, 44-45, 157, 204, 285 n.80 (2012) (discussing
the Society and its members); Brian Doherty, Book Review, POLICY, Autumn 2013, at 61, 61-63
(analyzing the libertarian roots of the Society’s founders); A Short History of the Mont Pelerin Society,
MONT PELERIN SOC’Y, https://www.montpelerin.org/about-mps [https://perma.cc/X8UB-LZTW]
(last visited Apr. 15, 2020) (describing the Society’s founding). On Fritz Machlup as a founding member
of the Mont Pelerin Society, see his Cato Institute obituary. Gottfried Haberler, Fritz Machlup: In
Memoriam, 3 CATO J. 11, 13 (1983). On the relationship between the Mont Pelerin society and neoliberal
thought, see R.M. HARTWELL, The Mont Pelerin Society and the Revival of Liberalism, in A HISTORY OF
THE MONT PELERIN SOCIETY 191-217 (1995). See generally THE ROAD FROM MONT PÈLERIN, supra
note 5. Robert Van Horn has analyzed the Society’s influence on Chicago economics’ attitudes toward
business concentration. See Robert Van Horn, Chicago’s Shifting Attitude Toward Concentrations of Business
Power (1934-1962), 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1527, 1537-40 (2011).
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whenever firms use the profits from market power to obtain and keep that
market power.
Because a ﬁrm has a ﬁnancial incentive to use the proﬁt from market
power in order to maintain it, economic theory predicts that this would occur
often. The Chicagoans thus needed an additional critical assumption: markets
are inherently self-correcting and if left alone, they will work themselves
pure. For example, cartels are naturally unstable, there are few entry barriers,
monopoly attracts disruptive entry, mergers almost never produce anything
except reduced costs, and vertical integration and contracting are unmitigated
goods. With these assumptions in hand, government intervention in the form
of antitrust enforcement is not needed to deliver competitive markets.22
This combination of beliefs found fertile ground in U.S. antitrust policy
at mid-twentieth century. Enforcement at that time was excessively
interventionist. Courts often either used no economics or poor economics to
make decisions.23 For example, the Court famously applied the per se rule to
a competitively harmless joint venture because the rule of reason would “leave
courts free to ramble through the wilds of economic theory in order to
maintain a ﬂexible approach.”24
Here was a place where the Chicago School call to use economics in
antitrust analysis would generate less enforcement—and have the handy side
eﬀect of being correct. For example, its ﬁrst proposed reductions in
enforcement attacked decisions condemning very small horizontal mergers25
or competitively harmless vertical contracting.26 The changes that resulted
very likely increased consumer welfare and eﬃciency.
This side effect of being correct was critical to bringing the bulk of academic
economists on board the Chicago movement.27 The attractive feature of the
movement was not the ideology of less enforcement regardless of the facts, but
rather the idea of using economics to analyze business conduct in an effort to
maximize social welfare. The economics angle was the marketing genius of the
22 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1984) (“[T]he
economic system corrects monopoly more readily than it corrects judicial errors.”).
23 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Progressive Antitrust, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 85-87 (“Most
noticeable was [the Warren Court’s] treatment of economic eﬃciency almost as an aﬃrmative evil
rather than a goal to be pursued.”).
24 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972).
25 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (condemning merger on
very small market shares, in part because it reduced the merging ﬁrms’ costs); see also United States
v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 273-74 (1966) (similar).
26 See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968) (ruling that setting maximum
resale prices was per se illegal); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967)
(prohibiting a bicycle manufacturer from preventing distributors from selling outside approved territories).
27 Indeed, one of the authors remembers being taught in graduate school in 1989 that
economics was not used in antitrust prior to the Chicago revolution and that it led to the current
consumer welfare standard used by courts.
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Chicago School, but it was a means to an end, not the end itself, as would later
become clear when the School began to disavow later developments in
economics. In the late 1970s, economically weak antitrust decisions from the
1960s and earlier provided plenty of low hanging fruit.
This movement sowed the seeds of its own intellectual decline, although
its inﬂuence continued for decades. As economic reasoning was incorporated
into court decisions, the marginal antitrust case became less oﬀensive to good
economics. Conduct that fell right on the (moving) line became more
anticompetitive over time. Arguing that this more anticompetitive conduct
was still benign became more diﬃcult. Thus, as litigated cases trended,
defendants’ conduct became more diﬃcult to justify economically. The
practical success of the intellectual movement weakened its argument for
reducing enforcement any further. Indeed, more up-to-date economic
analysis revealed anticompetitive conduct and called for greater
enforcement.28 Making the problem worse, about this time (1980s) the
economics profession developed applied game theory and there was a spate
of sophisticated models of imperfect competition.29 Now many more patterns
of anticompetitive conduct could be explained and understood, particularly
those in oligopoly markets.
While Bork’s inﬂuential book The Antitrust Paradox was based largely on
work he published in the 1960s,30 it came out in 1978,31 well after the game
theory revolution and advances in modeling monopolistic competition and

28 See George L. Priest, The Limits of Antitrust and the Chicago School Tradition, 6 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 4-5 (2010) (recounting how Ronald Coase disliked an article the
author wrote that found the Supreme Court should have been more interventionist). Others called
for greater enforcement as well. See Janusz A. Ordover et al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM.
ECON. REV. 127, 131-40 (1990) (showing how vertical integration may result in downstream ﬁrms
being cut oﬀ from suppliers); Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J.
ECON. 345, 355 (1988) (describing the “per se legal[ity]” of vertical mergers as having “a shaky
theoretical and no empirical foundation”); Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion,
80 AM. ECON. REV. 837, 837-41 (1990) (examining the anticompetitive eﬀects of tying).
29 For an overview of this issue see Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV.
1291 (1990) (book review). See also Avinash Dixit, A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry
Barriers, 10 BELL J. ECON. 20 (1979); Avinash Dixit, The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence, 90
ECON. J. 95 (1980); Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Capital as a Commitment: Strategic Investment to
Deter Mobility, 31 J. ECON. THEORY 227 (1983); David M. Kreps et al., Rational Cooperation in the
Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245 (1982); A. Michael Spence, The
Learning Curve and Competition, 12 BELL J. ECON. 49 (1981).
30 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Anticompetitive Enforcement Doctrines Under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 39 TEX. L. REV. 832 (1961); Robert H. Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: I, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
401 (1965); Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363
(1965); Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division,
75 YALE L.J. 775 (1966); Robert H. Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare, 77 YALE
L.J. 950 (1968).
31 See BORK, supra note 16.
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imperfect information were underway.32 Bork did not consider these new
economic tools. His book was also quaint and old fashioned in other ways. By
1980 the role of intellectual property, networks, and information technologies
was becoming well established in antitrust policy.33 Bork’s book barely
mentioned them, and almost completely ignored patents. His view of
technology was entirely backward-looking. The Antitrust Paradox is peopled
largely by the conventional manufacturers and dealers that dominated
antitrust policy prior to 1970, and where much of the excessive intervention
had occurred.
Combined with this old economics was an important legal default: when
the conduct at issue admitted of any doubt, government should not intervene.
By placing the burden of proof onto the government or plaintiﬀ to show that
a course of conduct was anticompetitive, any conduct that could not be
analyzed or explained became effectively legal. This key antitrust enforcement
default drove the Chicago School’s attitude toward economics.
Increasingly, a characteristic of the Chicago School became its inability to
change the enforcement answer in response to changes in the economic
environment created by advances in the discipline such as game theory and
advanced estimation techniques. Recall the Chicago default: if the conduct
cannot be proven anticompetitive, the right answer is no enforcement. But
new tools explain conduct; given a situation, they can demonstrate if conduct
is anticompetitive or procompetitive. Thus, the application of tools will yield
some proportion of cases that require enforcement. A movement that was
formed in order to reduce enforcement had no incentive to adopt modern
economic tools if these tended—because they created clarity—to justify
greater intervention in some cases. It quickly became clear that “Chicago
Economics” was deﬁned by the outcome it delivered, not any coherent set of
principles or techniques.
As time went on, more unrealistic assumptions were needed in order to
justify nonenforcement. For example, in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. the Supreme Court declared that recoupment is not

32 See, e.g., Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets:
An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, in UNCERTAINTY IN ECONOMICS 257, 259-80
(Peter Diamond & Michael Rothschild eds., 1978); John F. Nash, Equilibrium Points in n-Person
Games, 36 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 48, 48-49 (1950); Reinhard Selten, The Chain Store
Paradox, 9 THEORY & DECISION 127 (1978).
33 See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1979) (declining
to characterize a blanket licensing scheme for copyrighted music as per se illegal); United States v.
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 142-43 (D.D.C. 1982) (describing a consent decree containing
the terms surrounding the breakup of AT&T), aﬀ ’d sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S.
1001 (1983).
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possible in oligopoly markets.34 The game theory literature published in the
ﬁfteen years prior to the decision stands out for its contributions showing just
the opposite.35 The decision in California Dental Ass’n v. Federal Trade
Commission seemed hopelessly naïve about the threat of collusion in markets
with imperfect information.36 Antitrust enforcement in the United States
today displays this history of a growing separation between court decisions
and economic reasoning.37
Exacerbating the failure to keep up with developments in economics was
the inﬂuence of parties who stood to proﬁt from reduced antitrust
enforcement. Conservative institutions were funded by ﬁrms that proﬁted
from nonintervention.38 They organized education and inﬂuence programs
targeting academics and the judiciary.39 In addition, funding sources are often
34 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 219 (1993) (aﬃrming
the Court of Appeals’ view that “rely[ing] on the characteristics of an oligopoly to assure recoupment
of losses from a predatory pricing scheme after one oligopolist has made a competitive move is
. . . economically irrational”).
35 See Dilip Abreu, Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames, 39 J. ECON. THEORY 191
(1986); William A. Brock & José A. Scheinkman, Price Setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints,
52 REV. ECON. STUD. 371 (1985); Ariel Rubinstein, Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking
Criterion, 21 J. ECON. THEORY 1 (1979).
36 Cal. Dental Ass’n. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 774-75 (1999) (ﬁnding it was not
obvious that a producer-enforced ban on price advertising would have an anticompetitive eﬀect).
37 See infra Part II; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Looming Crisis in Antitrust Economics, B.U.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 2), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3153&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/T8YS-4QJM] (observing that advocates at
both poles of the political spectrum misplace the role of economics in antitrust enforcement).
38 A 2004 report by the National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, a watchdog group,
found that Koch Industries’ philanthropy “give[s] money to nonproﬁt organizations that do research
and advocacy on issues that impact the proﬁt margin of Koch Industries.” See JANE MAYER, DARK
MONEY 180 (2017).
39 See, e.g., Jane Mayer, How Right-Wing Billionaires Infiltrated Higher Education, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.chronicle.com/article/How-Right-WingBillionaires/235286 [https://perma.cc/9D7P-FLJ7] (describing how the conservative Olin
Foundation’s “most signiﬁcant beachheads . . . were established in America’s law schools . . . .”); see
also David Dayen, Corporate-Funded Judicial Boot Camp Made Sitting Federal Judges More Conservative,
THE INTERCEPT (Oct. 23, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/10/23/federal-judiciary-henrymanne-law-economics [https://perma.cc/9YZZ-GAP5] (describing how over forty percent of federal
judges had attended economics bootcamps organized by the Law and Economics Center at its peak).
Additional important conservative donors to academia across the decades include Scaife, Volker,
Bradley, DeVos, and Mercer, among others. See Daniel Bice, Hacked Records Show Bradley Foundation
Taking Its Conservative Wisconsin Model National, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (May 5, 2017),
https://projects.jsonline.com/news/2017/5/5/hacked-records-show-bradley-foundation-takingwisconsin-model-national.html [https://perma.cc/7T8U-7HS9]; Robert G. Kaiser & Ira Chinoy,
Scaife: Funding Father of the Right, WASH. POST (May 2, 1999), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/special/clinton/stories/scaifemain050299.htm [https://perma.cc/3PUN-Q6S8]; Jane
Mayer, Betsy Devos, Trump’s Big-Donor Education Secretary, NEW YORKER (Nov. 24, 2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/betsy-devos-trumps-big-donor-education-secretary
[https://perma.cc/GF5U-RGAM]; David Gindis, Law and Economics Under the Palms: Henry Manne
at the University of Miami, 1974-1980 (Working Paper, Mar. 13, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com
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hidden, and some inﬂuences cannot be seen, such as authors who receive but
do not disclose ﬁnancing for their research. While the American Economic
Association has had a central disclosure policy since 2012,40 the law reviews
do not. And economic theory demonstrates that funding for antitrust
research will naturally be lopsided; there is no equivalent ﬁnancial incentive
to fund interventionist policy work because the beneﬁts of antitrust
enforcement accrue to consumers, who are very diﬀuse, not particular
companies or institutions. Antitrust enforcement turns monopoly markets
into competitive ones, corporate proﬁt into consumer surplus, and is therefore
a public good. As with any public good, it tends to be underprovided.
This background explains why the United States well overshot the mark
in reducing antitrust enforcement after the late 1970s.41 Markups have risen
steadily since the 1980s.42 The proﬁt share of the economy has risen from 2%
to 14% over the last three decades.43 The economic literature has come down
solidly against the key early assumption of the Chicago thinkers that markets
will self-correct. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that eliminating
antitrust enforcement likely results in monopoly prices and monopoly levels
of innovation in many markets.44 The higher prices (or lower quality) caused
by lack of enforcement are paid by all consumers, while the proﬁts accrue to

/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3567105 (detailing Henry Manne’s program of ﬁnancing conservative
law and economics); Jim Zarroli, Robert Mercer is a Force to Be Reckoned With in Finance and
Conservative Politics, NPR (May 26, 2017, 1:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/26/530181660/robertmercer-is-a-force-to-be-reckoned-with-in-finance-and-conservative-politic [https://perma.cc/CE569MFD].
40 See Dan Berrett, Economists Adopt New Disclosure Rules for Authors of Published Research,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 6, 2012), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Economists-AdoptNew/130257; Disclosure Policy, AM. ECON. ASS’N, https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/policies/disclosure-policy
[https://perma.cc/26PD-BKTL] (last visited May 9, 2020).
41 See Fiona Scott Morton, Modern U.S. Antitrust Theory and Evidence amid Rising Concerns of Market
Power and Its Effects, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (May 29, 2019),
https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/modern-u-s-antitrust-theory-and-evidence-amid-risingconcerns-of-market-power-and-its-effects [https://perma.cc/879H-9QBK] (“Since the 1970s, the range
of conduct that would be condemned by courts as anticompetitive has decreased significantly . . . .”).
42 See, e.g., Jan De Loecker & Jan Eeckhout, The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic
Implications 2-3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23687, 2017),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w23687.pdf [https://perma.cc/35JR-74ZU] (describing how average
markups rose from 18% to 67% from 1980 to 2014).
43 See Simcha Barkai, Declining Labor and Capital Shares 34 ﬁg.3 (Univ. of Chi. Stigler Ctr. for
the Study of the Econ. & the State, New Working Paper Series No. 2, 2016)
https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/pdfs/workingpapers/257.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YZ53-9MVW].
44 For a discussion of innovation, see Giulio Federico et al., Antitrust and Innovation: Welcoming
and Protecting Disruption (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 26005, 2019). There
is anticompetitive conduct in many markets. See generally Scott Morton, supra note 41 (compiling
the recent literature).

2020]

Framing the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis

1853

equity holders, disproportionately to a very small percentage at the top.45
Four decades of underenforcement has contributed to rising inequality, and a
reaction is appearing in the current political debate as populism.46
Today, Chicagoans still conﬂate their underenforcement ideology with
the use of economics itself. However, economics is a neutral tool. It may
predict a need for greater enforcement in some areas but less in others. The
Chicagoans embraced economics when it would achieve their antienforcement ends, but largely ignored its advances in theory and empirical
technique after 1970 because those tools sometimes proved that
anticompetitive conduct had occurred, and that enforcement was needed. The
movement created what might be called “Opportunistic Economics” by using
economic analysis when it delivered the desired answer and ignoring it when
it did not.
The remainder of this article examines brieﬂy the role of the Chicago
School in the making of antitrust law, focusing on the most fundamental
issues, including: (1) the nature of markets, entry barriers, theory of
competition and error cost analysis; (2) economic versus legal theories of
competitive harm, focusing on leverage and foreclosure; (3) the Chicago and
Harvard Schools, divergence, coalescence, and relative inﬂuence; and (4) the
importance of antitrust welfare tests.
I. MARKETS AND STRUCTURE
A. Market Diversity and Regulation
One important contribution of the marginalist revolution in economics
was the idea that markets diﬀer from one another in fundamental ways.47
Important contributors to market diversity were the variable presence of ﬁxed
costs and economies of scale, more complex theories about how sellers
interact with one another, and the increasing role of spatial and product
diﬀerentiation in descriptions of the economy. Along with this came the view
that market failure is more common than classicists from Adam Smith
45 See Joshua Gans et al., Inequality and Markets Concentration, When Shareholding is More Skewed
Than Consumption 1 (Ctr. for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Working Paper No. 62/2018, 2018),
https://cama.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/cama_crawford_anu_edu_au/201812/62_2018_gans_leigh_schmalz_triggs.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LE3-BET5] (showing that in the United
States, people in the top income quintile hold thirteen times more equity than those in the bottom three
quintiles combined).
46 See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 715 (2018)
(“American politicians are calling on antitrust to solve an array of problems associated with the
excessive power of large corporations in the United States.”).
47 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulation and the Marginalist Revolution, 71 FLA. L. REV. 455, 49293 (2019) (discussing the relationship between market failure and market diversity).
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through John Stuart Mill had allowed, and that the optimal amount and type
of regulatory intervention varies from one market to another.48 The result
was an increasingly institutional approach to industrial organization
economics that focused on diﬀerences among industries. For example, the
large series of academic “industry studies” that formed the core of industrial
organization research at Harvard stretched over a half century.49 Justice
Brandeis’s well known decision in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, with
its call to adjudicate antitrust cases by studying the entire history of the
industry, was an early reﬂection of this approach in antitrust law. This
approach required a rule of reason analysis that looked at the “facts peculiar
to the business” and “[t]he history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist,
[and] the reason for adopting the particular remedy.”50
The Chicago School’s answer to this conception of market diversity
reached beyond antitrust to issues of regulatory policy generally. Their main
eﬀort was to develop a common theory of competition that would cut across
market structures—something the economics profession increasingly
understood to be impossible.51 The result was not only suspicion of the
aggressive antitrust policy of the New Deal and after, but also a general assault
on New Deal regulatory policy, with its sector-speciﬁc agencies and diverse
approaches for diﬀerent markets.
The Chicago School critique of regulation began from a baseline of
perfect competition, just as it did for issues of price theory. It identiﬁed
perfect competition as optimal and regulatory departures as a consequence of
political processes—namely “capture” by special interest groups. George
Stigler’s well-known article on “The Theory of Economic Regulation”52 never
spoke in the traditional regulatory terminology of natural monopoly, high
ﬁxed costs, entry barriers, or bottlenecks. Rather, regulation was the outcome
of political struggles under which diﬀerent interest groups competed to see
who could beneﬁt the most from a particular government policy. “A central
48 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 279-81 (explaining that market failures necessitate varied
interventions). Marginalism also had an eﬀect on twentieth century regulatory policy. See
Hovenkamp, supra note 47, at 457-58, 484-85 (describing how the marginalist approach lent itself to
a mixed economy perspective of regulation).
49 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial Organization, 68
TEX. L. REV. 105, 112-13 (1989) (describing the Harvard economics department as “heavily
committed to the historical case-study method”).
50 Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
51 See Richard Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Performance, in 2 HANDBOOK
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 951, 952 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989)
(“[C]ross-section studies rarely if ever yield consistent estimates of structural parameters . . . .”);
Liran Einav & Jonathan Levin, Empirical Industrial Organization: A Progress Report, 24 J. ECON.
PERSP. 145, 145 (2010) (explaining that the ﬁeld moved away from “attempts to relate aggregate
measures across industries”).
52 Stigler, supra note 13.
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thesis of this paper,” he wrote, “is that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the
industry and is designed and operated primarily for its beneﬁt.”53
The message was that regulation is not a consequence of deﬁciencies in
markets, but rather of political imperfections that permit interest groups to
control markets for their own beneﬁt. Further, markets should be viewed as
similar in most fundamental particulars. Whenever possible, deviations from
equilibrium outcomes should be addressed through private bargaining rather
than state control.54 With this framing, analysis of the details of competition
in a market was unnecessary. The au courant views of oligopoly and
monopolistic competition were seen as greatly exaggerating the extent to
which markets deviated from competitive norms.55 Today a standard lesson
in an industrial organization economics class is that almost every market is
imperfectly competitive in some way, whether it be due to economies of scale,
imperfect information, impediments to entry, or one of many other reasons. When
those imperfections are especially large, it can be better for society to regulate—
also imperfectly—than allow unrestrained monopoly.
B. Oligopoly, Monopolistic Competition, and Appropriate Antitrust Responses
During the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, theories of imperfect
competition played an increasing role in industrial organization analysis. One
result was the rise of structuralism in the Harvard School, leading eventually
to proposals by Donald Turner and others to break up large ﬁrms.56 This was
very likely the high point of oligopoly determinism in antitrust policy.57
George J. Stigler’s severe redeﬁnition of oligopoly and his aggressive attacks
on monopolistic competition remain deﬁning contributions of the Chicago
School. So too was the Chicago School’s ﬁrm rejection of game theory,58 a
Id. at 3.
See, e.g., Coase, supra note 12, at 15-28 (describing the costs associated with governmental
regulation and arguing that such regulation can reﬂect the government’s self-interest).
55 See GEORGE J. STIGLER, Competition, in THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 5, 5-23 (1968)
(dividing American industries into competitive and monopolized); see also ROBERT H. BORK,
Monopoly and Oligopoly: The Problem of Horizontal Size by Internal Growth, in THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX, supra note 16, at 163, 163-97 (acknowledging monopoly and competition but disputing the
policy relevance of anything in between).
56 See, e.g., Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 671 (1962); see also infra notes 70–71 and
accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 70–71 and accompanying text; see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, Structuralism
in Competition Policy, in THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 8, at 206, 206-19 (tracing
the rise of oligopoly theory and structuralism in U.S. antitrust policy).
58 George Stigler was well-known for his rejection of this ﬁeld. See, e.g., STIGLER, supra note
14; see also BORK, supra note 16, at 175; Harold Demsetz, George J. Stigler: Midcentury Neoclassicalist
with a Passion to Quantify, 101 J. POL. ECON. 793, 799 (1993) (observing that Stigler “neither endorsed
nor participated” in game theory, even though “a key rationale for using game theory to analyze
53
54
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necessary tool for understanding markets with only a few competitors. The
reliance on price theory and inability to appreciate oligopoly account for
much of the skepticism that Chicago School antitrust writing has had towards
theories of harm that interact with market structure.
Cournot’s oligopoly theory postulated that each ﬁrm in a market for an
undiﬀerentiated product would take the output of rivals as given and then set
its own output by equating its marginal cost and its own marginal revenue
over the remaining (“residual”) demand.59 Edward Chamberlin’s advance was
to allow for diﬀerentiated products and endogenous entry.60 The
Chamberlain problem is very complex compared to the simpler Cournot
setting and could not be solved before the advances of the 1970s through
1990s.61 A second important advance in oligopoly theory was the game theory
revolution of the 1970s and 1980s.62 This work demonstrated that more
collusive equilibria were possible if the dynamic nature of the competitive
interaction was taken into account.63 Competitors could sustain higher prices
in the short run by realizing that any deviation would lead to a collapse of
friendly cooperation in the long run.64 The literature shows that under
particular conditions (such as valuing proﬁt in the future) each ﬁrm will
adhere to the higher price.
In earlier work Stigler listed various reasons why he thought cartel
agreements or tacit collusion would break down: oligopolists would ﬁnd the
contemporaneous gains from cheating on the cartel price larger than the gains
from adhering. In some situations, depending on the size distribution of
ﬁrms, the number of customers that would move, and other factors, cheating
could be proﬁtable in some cases but not others.65 Stigler also listed a variety
of transaction costs faced by cartels attempting to agree on a collusive course
microeconomic problems was neoclassical price theory’s inability to shed light on the functioning of
oligopolistic markets”).
59 See AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF
THE THEORY OF WEALTH 79-89 (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., The MacMillan Co. 1897) (1838).
60 See EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 71-116,
130-73 (8th ed. 1962).
61 See G. Steven Olley & Ariel Pakes, The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications
Equipment Industry, 64 ECONOMETRICA 1263 (1996); see also Demsetz, supra note 58.
62 See e.g., Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND
J. ECON. 70 (1985); Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, A “Signal-Jamming” Theory of Predation, 17 RAND J.
ECON. 366 (1986); Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Learning-by-Doing and Market Performance, 14 BELL
J. ECON. 522 (1983); Edward J. Green & Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price
Information, 52 ECONOMETRICA 87 (1984); David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect
Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253 (1982); see also supra notes 29, 32.
63 See supra notes 32, 61.
64 See supra note 32.
65 See generally Stigler, supra note 15, at 44 (“[C]ollusion is much more eﬀective in some
circumstances than in others.”). For excellent commentary, see Dennis W. Carlton & Sam Peltzman,
Introduction to Stigler’s Theory of Monopoly, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 237 (2010).
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of action.66 Markets will vary in their information ﬂows and transparency and
the diﬃculty of detecting defections will vary accordingly. The subsequent
game theory literature incorporated these observations and recognized them
as reasons why some markets may be able to sustain higher collusive prices
than others.67
Chicago School legal scholars picked up on Stigler’s critique of oligopoly
in diﬀerent ways. Posner’s nuanced, progressive 1969 essay on oligopoly and
the antitrust laws was a tour de force that actually promised to strengthen
enforcement of the law against price ﬁxing.68 He began with Stigler’s theory
that concentrated market structures gave ﬁrms diﬀerential incentives to
deviate from an oligopoly equilibrium, and that the factors causing these
differential incentives could provide a basis for identifying actionable
“tacit collusion.”69
Posner’s foil was Donald F. Turner, who had just left his position as head
of the Antitrust Division to return to Harvard.70 Turner began with the
position that high price-cost margins in concentrated industries were largely
inevitable, and that the only workable solution was legislation breaking up
larger ﬁrms.71 Today many economists would hesitate to break up oligopolistic
ﬁrms if they had arrived at that market structure by competitive means
because their high ﬁxed costs very likely entail that restructuring would do
more harm than good.72 By contrast, consumers might beneﬁt from breaking
up ﬁrms in an oligopoly that was created by an anticompetitive horizontal
merger or other conduct. Posner followed Stigler’s approach that market
structure is no more than another factor that each oligopolist must take into
account as it evaluates the proﬁtability of a particular price or output
decision.73 As a result, antitrust policy could approach tacitly colluding
oligopolists by looking at the structure and actions that promise to make price
66 See Stigler, supra note 15, at 45-46 (listing factors including agreeing on price structure and
enforcing the agreement).
67 See, e.g., Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a
Heterogeneous Cartel, 32 INT’L ECON. REV. 767 (1991).
68 See Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 1562 (1969); see, e.g., id. at 1590 (arguing for both remedial and punitive damages in price-ﬁxing
enforcement).
69 Id. at 1566-67; see also Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 925 (1979) [hereinafter Posner, Chicago School]; Richard A. Posner, Oligopolistic Pricing Suits,
The Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare: A Reply to Professor Markovits, 28 STAN. L. REV. 903 (1976).
70 Posner, supra note 68, at 1562.
71 See Turner, supra note 56, at 671. An important precursor was Carl Kaysen. See Carl Kaysen,
Collusion Under the Sherman Act, 65 Q.J. ECON. 263, 269-70 (1951) (discussing enforcement in
oligopolistic markets).
72 See JEAN TIROLE, THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1989) (discussing the loss of
economies of scale or network eﬀects).
73 Posner, supra note 68, at 1564-65 (“Oligopolists are . . . ‘interdependent’ in their pricing.”).
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increases proﬁtable, such as the ability to raise price without detection, the
likely duration of cheating and the diﬃculty of detecting cheaters and likely
success of punishing them, the height of entry barriers, the availability and
eﬀects of price discrimination, the diﬃculty of discouraging new market
entrants, and the like.74
Robert Bork’s proposal was far more ham-handed. He simply denied the
existence of oligopoly as a serious antitrust problem.75 While he appreciated
Posner’s idea that individual behaviors could be used to establish tacit
collusion in concentrated markets, he doubted their workability. More
importantly, however, he doubted “that tacit collusion is an important
phenomenon, or even that it is a real phenomenon.”76 Today, Bork’s bottom
line conclusion that nothing can be done about oligopoly seems quaint,
simplistic, and wrong. Bork’s view that oligopoly simply be disregarded was
never taken seriously by either mainstream writers or the courts. First,
although the attack on market concentration based on evidence of high
accounting proﬁts has been largely repudiated, today it seems equally clear
that increases in concentration can result in anticompetitive outcomes like
increased margins and higher prices. While subsequent revisions of the
original 1968 Merger Guidelines de-emphasized purely structural evidence,77
mergers are the main example of a discrete change in market structure that
can reduce competition. Therefore, structure continues to play an essential
role in Horizontal Merger Guidelines revisions all the way through the
current 2010 Guidelines.78 An abundance of empirical literature supports the
usefulness of the structural presumption in preventing both adverse unilateral
effects and market structures likely to succumb to tacit collusion.79
Posner’s more reﬁned proposals concerning oligopoly have had some
impact in antitrust adjudication. They were taken more seriously than Bork’s
because Posner recognized a real problem that is well supported by the
evidence. His ideas have had considerable impact on merger review. The risk
of coordinated eﬀects (tacit collusion) is higher when concentration increases,

74 See 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 1428-1436 (4th
ed. 2017) (expanding on these proposals and their application in the case law and literature).
75 See BORK, supra note 16, at 196 (“[I]t looks very much as though there is a high probability,
amounting in fact to a virtual certainty, that dissolving any oligopolistic ﬁrm that grew to its present
size would inﬂict a serious welfare loss.”).
76 Id. at 175.
77 Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1968), https://www.justice.gov/sites
/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11247.pdf [https://perma.cc/ES5W-Q26B].
78 See 4 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶ 926(c) (discussing the historical
development of the Department of Justice’s guidelines). See generally id. ¶¶ 925-928.
79 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure, and
Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996, 2001-08 (2018) (surveying the literature).
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particularly when there is already evidence in the industry of some existing
or attempted tacit collusion.80
Nevertheless, identifying tacit behaviors that can be condemned under
the Sherman Act’s “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy” language has
proven diﬃcult.81 Courts almost never ﬁnd a violation in the absence of more
explicit and conventional communications among the defendants.82 Even the
“[u]nfair methods of competition” language in the FTC Act,83 which contains
no agreement requirement, has largely proven unworkable.84 More than forty
years after making his proposal, Judge Posner drew back, mainly because the
conduct it described seemed to be beyond an effective remedy.85
This naturally places a burden on merger policy, which is “prophylactic”
in the sense that it is intended to prevent anticompetitive performance that
might occur after the merger, but that collusion policy itself cannot reach.86
Even a Chicago judge such as Posner recognized in Hospital Corp. of America
v. FTC that fewer competitors in a market would make it “easier . . . for them
to coordinate their pricing without committing detectable violations of
section 1 of the Sherman Act.”87 In sharp contrast, Bork argued that
incipiency tests for mergers had “no value whatever.”88 In practice, enforcers
do rely heavily on the likelihood of successful tacit collusion in assessing
merger cases.89 The important diﬀerence between collusion policy under the
See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
See 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶ 1433(a) (“The courts are nearly unanimous
in saying that mere interdependent parallelism does not establish the contract, combination, or
conspiracy . . . .”). See generally id. ¶¶ 1431-1435.
83 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2018).
84 See, e.g., In re Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425, 536-40 (1983) (interpreting the “unfair methods
of competition” clause broadly to cover parallel behavior in oligopoly), rev’d sub nom. E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984) (interpreting the clause
narrowly by aﬃrming that “the mere existence of an oligopolistic market structure in which a small
group of manufacturers engage in consciously parallel pricing of an identical product does not violate
the antitrust laws”); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 4.6d (6th
ed. 2020) (“[T]he Commission’s eﬀorts to use the FTC Act to attack collusion or oligopoly
facilitators in the absence of agreement have not been encouraging.”).
85 Richard A. Posner, Review of Kaplow, Competition Policy and Price Fixing, 79 ANTITRUST
L.J. 761, 763 (2014) (book review) (reanalyzing his former position and ﬁnding force in the
counterargument that one should have “doubts about the feasibility of an antitrust remedy for tacit
collusion”).
86 See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Prophylactic Merger Policy, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 45 (2018)
(evaluating tests used for evaluating mergers involving ﬁrms in incipiency).
87 Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 807 F.2d 1381, 1387 (7th Cir. 1986).
88 BORK, supra note 16, at 131.
89 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 7 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 HMG] (classifying a range of behaviors as
“[c]oordinated interaction”); see also Nathan H. Miller et al., Oligopolistic Price Leadership and
Mergers: The United States Beer Industry (June 14, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
80
81
82
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Sherman Act and merger policy is that the “may . . . substantially . . . lessen
competition” language of Section 7 of the Clayton Act encompasses any
behavior that might lead to noncompetitive outcomes,90 without getting
waylaid by the “contract, combination, or conspiracy” requirement.
Stigler’s critique of monopolistic competition was more aggressive but
also more defensive. He argued that Chamberlin’s theory was not testable,91
a point developed a few years later by Milton Friedman.92 By contrast, in 1967
Paul Samuelson believed that while the tools to test monopolistic competition
and oligopoly theories were not yet developed, they together represented a
much more fulsome description of markets.93 Through the 1960s and 1970s
the model became more mainstream and applied to a variety of market
structures.94 Subsequently, other researchers brought the literature forward
with new game theoretic models featuring asymmetric information,
unobserved types, endogenous entry and exit, stochastic shocks, and more.95
This literature also included advances in empirical techniques to allow
estimation and testing.96 Indeed, because there are vanishingly few perfectly
competitive markets, the models and methods that accommodate imperfect
and monopolistic competition are the most commonly used in the
empirical literature.

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/1494697/weinbergmillersheu.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4CCH-RUFN] (featuring a simulation of the ABI-Modelo merger using retailer
scan data to evaluate the likelihood of collusion).
90 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018).
91 See GEORGE J. STIGLER, Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect, 12, 12-24, in FIVE LECTURES
ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS (1949) (“Professor Chamberlin did not reduce his picture of reality to
a manageable analytical system.”).
92 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
ECONOMICS 3, 15, 38-39 (1953) (criticizing the theory of monopolistic competition developed by
Chamberlin and Robinson). Friedman believed that in its search for descriptive realism,
monopolistic competition had rendered itself untestable. Id. at 38-41.
93 See Paul A. Samuelson, The Monopolistic Competition Revolution, in M ONOPOLISTIC
COMPETITION THEORY, at 105, 108 n.5 (Robert E. Kuenne ed., 1967).
94 See, e.g., Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product
Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297, 308 (1977) (analyzing ﬁrms facing diﬀerent cost structures and
demand elasticities); Steven C. Salop, Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods, 10 BELL J. ECON.
141, 141 (1979) (examining an example of a two-industry economy with a second commodity).
95 See, e.g., Steven Berry et al., Do Increasing Markups Matter? Lessons from Empirical Industrial
Organization, 33 J. ECON. PERSP. 44, 44-45 (2019) (using modern game theory to incorporate, inter
alia, ﬁrm entry conditions); Aviv Nevo, Mergers with Diﬀerentiated Products: The Case of the Ready-toEat Cereal Industry, 31 RAND J. ECON. 395, 400 (2000) (adjusting for unobserved product
characteristics); see also Timothy F. Bresnahan & Richard Schmalensee, The Empirical Renaissance in
Industrial Economics: An Overview, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 371 (1987) (discussing the empirical progress
that had already occurred by the 1980s).
96 See, e.g., Steven Berry et al., Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium, 63 ECONOMETRICA
841 (1995).
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Models of imperfect competition are also now used to estimate the
unilateral price eﬀects likely to result from a merger.97 A classic setting is an
oligopoly where each ﬁrm produces a portfolio of diﬀerentiated products such
as cereal, beer, automobiles, or media. Modern techniques—with appropriate
data—can measure how closely the products of the merging ﬁrms compete
with one another. Mergers of products that consumers judge to be closer
substitutes permit larger price increases, all else equal. When detailed data or
the right setting are not available, the plaintiﬀ can generate an estimate of
likely harm by using simpler calculations such as UPP (“upward pricing
pressure”) which relies on the theory of monopolistic competition but
requires a knowledge only of margin and diversion or market shares.98
C. Barriers to Entry
Harvard School economist Joe S. Bain had done pioneering work on entry
barriers in the 1950s.99 Bain deﬁned entry barriers as any market factor that
blocked entry while yet permitting the ﬁrms in the market to charge above
cost prices.100 That deﬁnition was completely indiﬀerent to whether the
source of the entry barrier or the defendant’s conduct was socially desirable.
Bain wanted to know only whether the conditions of entry tended to shelter
the exercise of monopoly power.
By contrast, the Stigler/Chicago School deﬁnition of entry barriers was
much more normative, describing them as “a cost of producing . . . which
must be borne by a ﬁrm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by
ﬁrms already in the industry.”101 One diﬀerence between the Bain and Stigler
approaches occurs in the presence of ﬁxed costs plus economies of scale,
97 These models generally do not track the orthodox theory of monopolistic competition
because they do not presume that entry is free. Indeed, they condemn mergers only if entry barriers
are suﬃcient to suggest that higher post-merger prices will not be disciplined by new entry. See 2010
HMG, supra note 89, § 9 (“A merger is not likely to enhance market power if entry into the market
is so easy that the merged ﬁrm and its remaining rivals in the market . . . could not proﬁtably raise
price . . . compared to the level that would prevail in the absence of the merger.”).
98 Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to
Market Definition, 10 B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 1 (2010) (making the case for using UPP as a
“simple and speedy indicator” of whether a proposed merger is likely to raise prices).
99 See JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 1 (2d prtg. 1962) (examining “the
character and signiﬁcance of the ‘condition of entry’ to manufacturing industries”). Bain was
educated at Harvard but spent most of his career at the University of California at Berkeley. See
HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 213.
100 See BAIN, supra note 99, at 3 (deﬁning entry barriers as “the extent to which established
sellers can persistently raise their prices above a competitive level without attracting new ﬁrms to
enter the industry”).
101 STIGLER, supra note 14, at 67; see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 56
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting the diﬀerence between the two tests but ﬁnding it unnecessary
to resolve the question).
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which may give a decisive advantage to incumbent ﬁrms. For example, if
minimum eﬃcient scale in a market is 30% of sales at the competitive price,
three ﬁrms already in that market can collectively charge above cost prices
without incurring entry. This makes scale economies a qualifying entry
barrier under the Bainian deﬁnition but not the Stiglerian deﬁnition, because
the diﬃculties faced by the fourth ﬁrm are no greater than those overcome
by the ﬁrst three.102 Network eﬀects can operate in the same way, giving
early—and perhaps lucky—entrants a decisive advantage.103
Stigler’s point was that there is nothing undesirable about scale economies
or network eﬀects. However, Stigler is incorrect, ﬁrst because those forces
will cause diﬀerent eﬀects depending on the setting, and second, the welfare
economics may not be positive unless every entry barrier simply returns
appropriate gains to an eﬃcient, foresighted ﬁrm. If not, they may create cost
savings or beneﬁt increases, but they also can create higher prices, lower
quality, and less innovation.104 Importantly, antitrust law does not punish
ﬁrms for taking advantage of high entry barriers and overcoming risk. Rather,
the impact of entry barriers is relevant to antitrust because they operate as
part of the environment within which conduct must be evaluated.105
In Stigler’s defense, he was writing against a background of structuralism
and very weak requirements for anticompetitive conduct by dominant
ﬁrms.106 If one thinks of antitrust violations as being inherently without fault,
then the Stigler deﬁnition makes more sense. In a system where conduct is
evaluated from a more neutral starting point, however, it does not serve any
useful purpose. For example, if a large ﬁrm in an industry subject to
signiﬁcant scale economies excludes a rival by ﬁling a fraudulent patent
infringement action,107 the question is whether the conduct realistically
102 See Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 47, 47-48 (1982) (ﬁnding that
economies of scale are an entry barrier for Bain, but not for Stigler “so long as entrants have access
to the same cost function”); Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1973) [hereinafter Demsetz, Industry Structure].
103 Gregory J. Werden, Network Eﬀects and Conditions of Entry: Lessons from the Microsoft Case,
69 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 91-92 (2001) (arguing that network eﬀects are frequently insurmountable for
new entrants, absent another substantial competitive advantage over incumbents).
104 See Berry et al., supra note 95, at 45 (identifying welfare eﬀects for consumers as ranging
from ambiguous to altogether absent).
105 For example, the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines discuss the role of entry barriers in
evaluating a merger. Higher entry barriers allow more exercise of any new market power by the
combined ﬁrm. See 2010 HMG, supra note 89, § 9.
106 See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 206-19 (discussing structuralism and U.S.
antitrust policy).
107 See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 173 (1965)
(considering whether a ﬁrm’s maintenance and enforcement of a fraudulent patent against a rival
can constitute a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act); see also 4 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 74, ¶ 706 (explaining how bad faith patent infringement actions are exclusionary under
Section 2).
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threatens to prolong or enlarge the defendant’s market power while deterring
entry. Simply saying that the conduct is beyond challenge because any new
ﬁrms would face the same entry costs as the dominant ﬁrm had faced serves
to protect harmful monopoly.
D. Market Structure and Mergers
The Chicago School was itself divided on merger policy. Bork largely
denied the theory of oligopoly and believed that all mergers except those to
near monopoly should be lawful.108 Posner’s position was more relaxed than
existing law at that time, but not nearly as extreme as Bork’s. He would be
more likely to condemn mergers in markets where the four largest ﬁrms
accounted for more than 60% of the market.109
In the 1980s both the Supreme Court and government enforcement policy
began to deemphasize the role of pure structure and added other factors,
including nonstructural features bearing on the risk of collusion, barriers to
entry, and eﬃciencies.110 Even so, structural features have always been central
to the analysis of horizontal mergers, given the fear that they might facilitate
collusion or collusion-like behavior. They remain a dominant feature in the
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines for collusion-facilitating mergers.111
By contrast, the dramatic rise of “unilateral eﬀects” merger analysis112
does not ﬁt into Chicago School antitrust economics at all. As noted
previously, the School was strongly resistant to monopolistic competition
analysis. Under monopolistic competition theory, ﬁrms can proﬁt by
diﬀerentiating their products so as to create greater distance between
themselves and their nearest competitors. Unilateral eﬀects theory shows that
ﬁrms can raise prices by merging with rivals that are close in product space,
leaving a lower cross-elasticity of demand between their new set of products
and their closest remaining rivals.113 Unilateral eﬀects theory additionally
requires a barrier (in the Bainian sense) such that entrants cannot enter in a

See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 112 (1976) (“There is little basis in current
thinking for automatic intervention in markets in which the four largest ﬁrms have a combined
market share of less than 60 percent.”).
110 See Demsetz, Industry Structure, supra note 102, at 5 (commenting on the need to look at
reasons for high concentration levels).
111 2010 HMG, supra note 89, § 7 (discussing the structural features that make a market more
vulnerable to coordinated conduct).
112 Id. § 6 (describing diﬀerent ways in which the merger of two ﬁrms may, in itself, unilaterally
and substantially reduce competition).
113 See 4 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶ 914.
108
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timely, likely, and suﬃcient manner and incumbents cannot quickly
reposition to replace the lost competition.114
Models of vertical relationships that include bargaining and sophisticated
econometrics can be used to evaluate vertical mergers, disposing of Bork’s
strong conclusion that vertical mergers are virtually never anticompetitive.
For example, as a result of a vertical acquisition a ﬁrm with a signiﬁcant
position in a primary market might be able to increase prices if revenue losses
at that level are more than oﬀset by captured sales at a secondary level. The
techniques are similar to those used to evaluate the unilateral eﬀects of
horizontal mergers.115 The government agencies’ recently released Vertical
Merger Guidelines discuss several of these possibilities.116
As the discipline of economics has become richer and more able to reﬂect
the true economy over time, realistic elements such as entry and mobility
barriers have become better understood. The value of a brand, as well as the
diﬃculty of creating intangible assets such as reputation for quality, internal
economies of scope, organizational culture, and the like are now carefully
modeled in the literature.117 In addition, regulatory barriers such as license
requirements, intellectual property, creation of distribution channels and so
forth, all combine to mean that entry barriers are common. The rise of the
digital economy and the impact of scale, scope, network eﬀects, and the power
of an installed base show that entry barriers in many growing industries are
getting bigger, not smaller.118
E. Leverage, Foreclosure, and Exclusion
The term “leverage” means diﬀerent things, but generally refers to the
idea that a ﬁrm with power in one market can use it as a “lever” to extend
that power into a second market. The Chicago critique of the leverage theory
rested on the premise that the demand for strong complements, such as a
typewriter and a ribbon, is based on consumers’ willingness to pay for the

See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, VERTICAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/ﬁles/documents/reports/us-department-justicefederal-trade-commission-vertical-merger-guidelines/vertical_merger_guidelines_6-30-20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6Y6B-26V7] [hereinafter 2020 VMG]. Examples 3 and 6 show how vertical mergers
could produce anticompetitive effects. Id. at 7, 9.
117 For further explanation of some of these concepts, see PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS,
ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION, AND MANAGEMENT (1992) and DAVID KREPS & JAMES BARON,
STRATEGIC HUMAN RESOURCES (1999).
118 See MARKET STRUCTURE & ANTITRUST SUBCOMM., REPORT, in FINAL REPORT 23, 11921 (Stigler Comm. on Digital Platforms ed., 2019) (noting that “certain characteristics of digital
technology” enable the creation of entry barriers).
114
115
116
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package.119 The idea that someone can earn additional monopoly proﬁts by
combining complementary goods is thus an economic fallacy. The critique
was aimed at decisions such as Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Carbice Corp. v.
American Patents Development Corp., where the seller of a patented ice box
required buyers to purchase its own dry ice, an essential refrigerant.120 The
tying arrangement did not exclude anyone because dry ice was a common
unpatentable commodity and the ice box itself, although patented, was never
shown to dominate any market.
But Brandeis was not concerned about use of the tie to exclude rivals.
Rather, it was the possibility that it could produce an overcharge by enabling
the patentee “to derive its proﬁt, not from the invention on which the law
gives it a monopoly but from the unpatented supplies with which it is
used.”121 If a monopoly could be contractually expanded in this way, Justice
Brandeis opined, a patentee “might conceivably monopolize the commerce in
a large part of unpatented materials used in its manufacture.”122
Brandeis did not invent the patent leverage theory. It originated in patent
law nearly a century earlier, long before the Sherman Act was passed, in
patent exhaustion cases holding that patentees “are entitled to but one royalty
for a patented machine.”123 As a result, patent doctrine forbad a patentee from
selling a patented device and then attempting to collect royalties a second
time through the use of post-sale restraints.124
In his critique of tying, Ward Bowman showed that in a very simple
setting one cannot enlarge monopoly proﬁts simply by tying two
complements. Consumers would pay more for one product only if the price
of the other product were proportionately reduced. This is known as the
theory of One Monopoly Rent or Single Monopoly Proﬁt. But it is a result
that can easily be broken if the setting is made more realistic. For example,
gains from tying can arise from second degree price discrimination. The
patentee could tie overpriced dry ice, reduce the price of the box, and earn
higher proﬁts by both expanding use of the device and earning more from
119 Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 20
(1957) (“[T]he tying sale is only a means of utilizing eﬀectively a power already possessed . . . .”); see
also Posner, Chicago School, supra note 69, at 929, 933-35 (1979) (arguing that consumers only care
about the total price of a product’s components, so a seller with a monopoly on one component
cannot extract additional proﬁt by monopolizing a second component).
120 Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31 (1931).
121 Id. at 31-32 (quoting Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502,
517 (1917)).
122 Id. at 32.
123 Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 340, 350 (1863).
124 See Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890-1955, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 311, 364-65 (2009) (stating that the “ﬁrst sale” doctrine prevented patentees from extracting
additional revenue from “downstream sales”).
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high intensity users of the combination. Such a tie would produce uncertain
but likely positive welfare eﬀects, particularly since its eﬀect would generally
be to increase output.125 This type of tie is extremely common.126
While Bowman’s argument is widely identiﬁed with the Chicago School’s
attack on leverage, the arguments had appeared much earlier in economists’
disputes about vertical integration.127 Already in the 1930s New York
University economist Myron Watkins had observed that leverage as Brandeis
characterized it was a fallacy: a price increase in the tying product would
impose a “handicap” upon distribution of the second article.128 The result was
that any advantage from a price change in one article would be oﬀset by a
“commensurate disadvantage” in the other.129
Under Chicago doctrine a patent is an investment which the inventor
should be allowed to monetize without limit because this will eﬃciently
stimulate more innovation. This simplistic argument does not hold up under
scrutiny; in the right circumstances a patent can provide the sort of market
power that can be used to carry out illegal conduct such as exclusion in other
markets. The FTC v. Qualcomm Inc. case is an example.130 Qualcomm would
only sell chips on which it had a monopoly to handset makers who both
licensed its patents and agreed not to challenge them.131 Despite having

125 See Erik N. Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm,
52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 928-44 (2010) (ﬁnding that second-degree price discrimination is often
welfare-increasing).
126 Consider razors and razor blades, printers and ink cartridges, mainframes and punch cards,
and coﬀee machines and pods.
127 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Robert Bork and Vertical Integration: Leverage, Foreclosure, and
Eﬃciency, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 983, 987, 994 (2014) (“One of the most astute observers of vertical
integration was Columbia economist John Maurice Clark, who rejected the ‘leverage’ or ‘double
monopoly profit’ theory of vertical integration in 1923 in his book on the economics of fixed costs.”).
128 See MYRON WATKINS, PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 220-21 (3d ed. 1940).
129 See id. John Maurice Clark had critiqued the theory even earlier, in his 1923 book on ﬁxed
costs. See Hovenkamp, supra note 127, at 987-89 (discussing J. MAURICE CLARK, STUDIES IN THE
ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS 136-137 (1923)). Other economists, such as MIT’s Morris
Adelman, also rejected Justice Brandeis’ version of the leverage theory. See M.A. Adelman,
Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARV. L. REV. 27, 45 (1949) (arguing that the primary concern
with vertical integration is market foreclosure); see also William B. Lockhart & Howard R. Sacks,
The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of
the Clayton Act, 65 HARV. L. REV. 913, 944 (1952) (explaining that vertical integration forecloses
access to a market by competing suppliers). Writing in 1954, regulatory economist Alfred E. Kahn
spoke in similar terms, describing tying arrangements as occurring on the “[b]orderline between
[c]ompeting and [f]oreclosing.” Alfred E. Kahn, A Legal and Economic Appraisal of the “New” Sherman
and Clayton Acts, 63 YALE L.J. 293, 328 (1954).
130 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658 (N.D. Cal. 2019), rev’d, 969 F.3d 974
(9th Cir. 2020); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, FRAND and Antitrust, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1683, 1685
(2020) (explaining how Qualcomm used discriminatory patent licensing to violate antitrust laws).
131 Qualcomm, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 673.
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signed a contract promising to license those patents on fair and reasonable
terms (FRAND), it refused to license them to rival chip makers.132 In
addition, it employed loyalty rebates to prevent customers from sourcing
chips for their new products from rival chip entrants, thus preserving a
monopoly in chips.133 The whole strategy was monetized through
supracompetitive patent royalties, all of which were bilaterally negotiated,
secret, and could not be challenged in court without the handset maker losing
access to chip supply. This type of more complex setting—of which there are
many modeled in the modern literature—demonstrates the manifold ways
that patents can be used to harm competition.
During its heyday, the leverage theory was inﬂuential and largely accounts
for development of the per se rule against tying, which did not even require
a showing of foreclosure, or market exclusion. It was an “extraction” theory
rather than a foreclosure theory. The tying plaintiﬀ could succeed by showing
that a “substantial volume” of commerce was covered by the tie.134 The
Harvard School was not responsible for these developments. Harvard School
scholars either rejected the theory or refused to defend it.135 For example,
Carl Kaysen and Donald Turner did not defend it in their 1959 book on
antitrust policy, roughly contemporaneous with Bowman’s article.136 Even
before Bork published The Antitrust Paradox, Areeda spoke strongly against it.137
The theory that more accurately separated the Chicago and Harvard
schools was “foreclosure,” or the idea that certain types of exclusive
contracting or other practices could exclude rivals or raise their costs. The
dominant ﬁrm could then charge a higher price. That theory did not depend
on the mistaken arithmetic of vertical leverage, although it did reﬂect the
Harvard belief that barriers to entry were more signiﬁcant and pervasive than
Chicago theory acknowledged. Indeed, Bork’s critique of foreclosure largely
identiﬁed it with leverage by assuming that entry would occur any time a ﬁrm
attempted to charge more than the competitive price for a tied good. When

Id. at 671-72.
Id. at 722 (“In sum, Qualcomm engaged in anticompetitive conduct toward BlackBerry by
conditioning chip supply assurances on BlackBerry signing a Qualcomm patent license agreement
and by paying BlackBerry chip incentive funds that functionally required BlackBerry to buy
Qualcomm modem chips, to the exclusion of rivals’ modem chips.”).
134 See 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶¶ 1721, 1721d3(c) (stating that the per se
rule requires “power over the tying product and coverage of a ‘not insubstantial’ volume of commerce
in the tied product”).
135 Cf. Herbert Hovenkamp, supra note 124, at 366 (“[T]he leveraging theory never held a
secure place in . . . the writings of Harvard School economists and lawyers . . . .”).
136 See CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY (1959).
137 See Phillip E. Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1127,
1138 (1976) (arguing that tying product overcharges are inherently oﬀset by price reductions in the
tied product).
132
133
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that assumption is relaxed, foreclosure is possible, particularly when the
practice itself makes the structure of the aﬀected market less competitive.138
Thus, for example, while Kaysen and Turner did not embrace the “double
monopoly proﬁts” theory of tying, they did accept that tying arrangements
in the presence of power served to create entry barriers in the market for the
tied product.139 Under their theory a tie raised entry barriers for the tied good
“to the level of those in the market for the tying good.”140 Their example was
IBM’s tie of computer punch cards.141 While entry into the punch card market
was easy, entry into computer manufacturing was not.142 They declined to
extend this per se rule to exclusive dealing, because in their view an exclusive
dealing contract “may provide substantial gains in certainty and ability to plan
forward . . . in a market in which supplies or demands ﬂuctuate unpredictably
and widely.”143 Kaysen and Turner exaggerated the diﬀerences between
exclusive dealing and tying, both of which can involve entrepreneurial risk
sharing. Indeed, today the distinction between exclusive dealing and tying
often fades into the hyper-technical question whether the tie involves
separate products.144
The Chicago position on foreclosure was, once again, insistence that
markets will work themselves pure. A ﬁrm claiming foreclosure was simply a
whining loser who was unable to compete in the marketplace.145 This
assumption and attitude have been undermined by an enormous economics
literature demonstrating the existence of proﬁtable foreclosure strategies,

138 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
515, 524-25 (1985) (discussing how prices charged by incumbent ﬁrms can aﬀect entry into a market);
Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837, 837 (1990) (stating
that tying allows a ﬁrm with a monopoly in one market to foreclose sales in a related market).
139 KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 136, at 157-58.
140 Id. at 157.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 157-58.
143 Id. at 159.
144 See, e.g., Jeﬀerson Par. Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 18-25 (1984) (analyzing whether
exclusive anesthesiology contract involved separate products or a package). In the franchise context,
see Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1352 (9th Cir. 1982), in which what was
essentially exclusive dealing was characterized by the plaintiﬀs as tying the Baskin-Robbins
trademark (the alleged tying product) and ice cream (the alleged tied product).
145 In The Limits of Antitrust, Easterbrook wrote that

every successful competitive practice has victims. The more successful a new method
of making and distributing a product, the more victims, the deeper the victims’
injury. . . . It is a neverending [sic] process of weeding out the sluggish and the
ineﬃcient. Yet those who lose in the competitive struggle do not view the outcome as
just.
Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 5.
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both in theory and in the marketplace.146 The government’s 2020 Vertical
Merger Guidelines also identify many circumstances in which foreclosure of
rivals is proﬁtable and anticompetitive.147
The law of exclusionary pricing engaged two of Chicago’s most cherished
themes. First was its doubts about the existence and signiﬁcance of entry
barriers, which the law expressed in a strict “recoupment” requirement.
Second was a belief that the basic practice of driving rivals out of business by
charging very low prices was so risky in relation to realistic payoﬀs as to be
irrational, which was the position that Bork took in The Antitrust Paradox.148
An irrational practice would not be undertaken by a meritorious competitor
and therefore plaintiﬀs must be ineﬃcient ﬁrms using the courts to try to
make up for their failings. Areeda and Turner’s well known 1975 law review
article on predatory pricing, which preceded The Antitrust Paradox by three
years, reﬂected similar concerns, although less vehemently. Areeda and
Turner ﬁrst asserted a recoupment requirement, although they did not
elaborate on it in much detail, except for an insistence that the defendant be
a “monopolist.”149 They also proposed the average variable cost test for
predatory pricing, which made it extremely diﬃcult to prove.150 Indeed, even
Judge Posner, whose views diverged from Bork’s, described the AreedaTurner test as “toothless.”151 The Supreme Court has adopted both prongs of
the Areeda-Turner test,152 although the practical result has come very close to
the Chicago School result—namely, predation plaintiﬀs virtually always lose.
Modern courts have made predatory pricing eﬀectively impossible to
prove. For example, Brooke Group assumes away all oligopoly cases in
146 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 230 (1986) (summarizing this position during
the heyday of this debate).
147 2020 VMG, supra note 116, § 4(a) (describing scenarios in which foreclosure could be
proﬁtable and anticompetitive).
148 BORK, supra note 16, at 144-59 (describing the theory and practice of predatory pricing with
skepticism).
149 See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section
2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 698 (1975) (“[T]he classically-feared case of predation
has been the deliberate sacriﬁce of present revenues for the purpose of driving rivals out of the
market and then recouping the losses through higher proﬁts earned in the absence of competition.”);
see also id. passim (limiting discussion to “monopolists”); cf. 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note
74, ¶¶ 725-726 (arguing for structural query similar to that in monopolization cases generally, but
against a speciﬁc recoupment requirement because it limits claims against defendants whose
predatory pricing was irrational).
150 See Areeda & Turner, supra note 149, at 716-18.
151 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 219 (2d ed. 2001); see also POSNER, supra note
109, at 188-89 (describing Posner’s own theory of predatory pricing as requiring either a price below
short-run marginal cost or a price below long-run marginal cost with intent to exclude).
152 See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007)
(most explicitly demonstrating the adoption of this position).
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contravention of economic theory.153 Average variable cost tests eliminate
liability for all products with low or zero marginal costs like airline seats or
digital goods.
F. Error Cost Analysis
One important element of the Chicago School’s ideology was its analysis
of error costs that put large weight on type one errors, or false positives, and
very little weight on type two errors, or false negatives.154 Given the Chicago
assumption that markets tend to be self-correcting, type two errors—where
the court fails to see anticompetitive conduct that actually exists—are not
really problematic because the market itself will correct the situation.155 By
contrast, false identiﬁcation of harmful monopoly tends not to be selfcorrecting because a court blocks the efficient conduct for a long time.
This argument is part and parcel with the Chicago School’s belief that
competitive equilibria are more robust and more durable than oligopoly,
monopolistic competition, monopoly, or any alternative. But invalidating that
premise largely undermines the Chicago approach to error costs. If we reverse
the premise and assume that markets tend more naturally to situations of
market power, then the opposite presumption is warranted. Economic theory
and evidence developed over the last forty years strongly support the reversed
premise. Game theory teaches us that there are many settings in which rivals
ﬁnd it in their interest to engage in collusion or collusion-like behavior.
Simple models demonstrate that mergers to monopoly are proﬁtable for all
ﬁrms. The literature includes many proﬁtable strategies for exclusion; these
allow a (typically) larger ﬁrm to drive its rivals out of the industry or into a
niche position using, for example, its proﬁt to reward a collaborator or its
market share as an inducement. Given the strong incentive that ﬁrms have to
cease competing, and the strong ability they have to reduce competition in

See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
See Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 15 (“In which direction should these rules err? For a number
of reasons, errors on the side of excusing questionable practices are preferable.”); see also Kevin A. Bryan
& Erik Hovenkamp, Startup Acquisitions, Error Costs, and Antitrust Policy, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 331, 334
(2020) (analyzing platform acquisitions of startups to show how false negatives can lead to monopoly);
Erik Hovenkamp & Steven C. Salop, Asymmetric Stakes in Antitrust Litigation 2-4 (Mar. 29, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3563843 (showing that
litigation against dominant firms is systematically biased against challengers); cf. Jonathan B. Baker,
Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 2
(2015) (arguing that antitrust conservatives “systematically overstate the incidence and significance of
false positives [and] understate the incidence and significance of false negatives”).
155 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 15 (“[T]he economic system corrects monopoly more
readily than it corrects judicial errors. . . . [I]n many cases the costs of monopoly wrongly permitted
are small, while the costs of competition wrongly condemned are large.”).
153
154
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the absence of antitrust laws, it is economically naïve to assume that markets
will naturally tend toward competition.
II. INFLUENCE ON ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Chicago and Harvard Schools
The Chicago School’s inﬂuence on antitrust decision making in the
federal courts has been more ideological than technical. In choosing technical
rules, the Supreme Court has almost always looked to the Harvard School.
One important reason for this is that Chicago School positions were stated
with extreme breadth but weak evidentiary support. The main culprit here
was Robert Bork, whose views often reached far beyond the evidence.
But Chicago School scholarship overreached in other ways. For example,
Lester Telser’s argument that resale price maintenance (“RPM”) might be
economically eﬃcient by reducing the opportunities for harmful free riding
was brilliant, but it described only a subset of RPM practices.156 While the
argument was later oﬀered as a general explanation for RPM, by its own
terms it was limited to instances where manufacturers would want it. An
equally robust theory was the idea that RPM was instigated by dealers who
were seeking a way to ﬁx their own prices or perhaps at the behest of a
powerful local dealer or dealer cartels who insisted on maintained prices for
their own beneﬁt.157
Much of the Chicago School’s disdain for the law of vertical restraints
ﬂows from its severe doubts about monopolistic competition. For example,
members of the Chicago School rejected the idea that so-called “intrabrand”
cartels were a signiﬁcant problem, essentially rejecting the possibility of
single brand cartels in diﬀerentiated markets.158 While the Supreme Court
wisely overruled the per se rules against nonprice restraints and RPM, it
adopted the rule of reason advocated by the Harvard School, rather than the
Chicago preference for rules of per se legality.159
156 Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86, 92 (1960)
(outlining how resale price maintenance beneﬁts manufacturers who want their retailers to oﬀer
special services such as demonstrations of the product).
157 This was almost certainly true of the original Dr. Miles case, in which RPM was facilitated
by a retail druggists’ cartel. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911);
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 340-47 (1991)
(describing a cartel of retail druggists that involved Dr. Miles, their supplier, in RPM).
158 Stating the Chicago position is the late Wesley J. Liebeler. See Wesley J. Liebeler, Intrabrand
“Cartels” Under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1982) (arguing that intrabrand restrictions
are not a concern of antitrust because they are not likely to restrict output).
159 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 901 (2007) (overruling the
previous per se rule and adopting a rule of reason in retail price maintenance cases); see also 8
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Overall, the Chicago School attitude toward exclusionary practices was
very benign, approaching per se legality for many of them. The Supreme
Court has nearly always followed the Harvard approach of applying a rule of
reason but being rather strict about standards of proof.160 The net result is
that plaintiﬀs lose many cases. Litigation under the rule of reason has become
extremely costly, to the point that the antitrust laws no longer eﬀectively
protect competition. An important part of any antitrust agenda for the future
must be making the rule of reason more capable of balanced administration.
This means that the plaintiﬀ’s prima facie case must be less elaborate and
burdensome, and proof of defenses—where the information is generally in
the possession of the defendant—must be more exacting.
B. Other Supreme Court Departures from Chicago Antitrust
The Chicago School has lost ground in the Supreme Court not only visà-vis Harvard School antitrust but in other ways as well, and even when
Justices vote against enforcement. Recent examples include161 the majority
opinion in Ohio v. American Express Co.,162 both opinions in Apple, Inc. v.
Pepper,163 and the three-Justice dissent in the North Carolina State Board of
Dental Examiners v. FTC case.164
The AmEx majority found that AmEx’s restraint on merchants’ practice
of “steering” customers from high cost AmEx to cheaper cards suggested that
the latter were free riding on AmEx’s investment.165 The free rider problem
has a distinctly Chicago School origin,166 but the majority completely ﬂubbed
the economics. As the dissent correctly pointed out, the majority overlooked
the fact that AmEx’s perks are not awarded simply for card possession; rather,
they are given only for transactions actually made with the American Express

AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶ 1620 (discussing the adoption of a rule of reason in Leegin
and how it overruled the per se Dr. Miles rule that preceded it).
160 See also Hillary Greene & D. Daniel Sokol, Judicial Treatment of the Antitrust Treatise, 100
IOWA L. REV. 2039, 2059 (2015) (noting a shift from the Chicago to Harvard view in the mid-1980s);
Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 597 (“The Supreme Court has nearly always followed the Harvard
approach.”); Kovacic, supra note 2.
161 See also Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756 (1999); POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001), supra note 151, at 30 (arguing that California Dental was too naïve
about collusion).
162 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2279 (2018) (Thomas, J.).
163 Apple, Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1518 (2019) (5-4 decision) (Kavanaugh, J.); id. at 1525
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
164 N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 574 U.S. 494, 516 (2015)
(Alito, J., dissenting).
165 See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2289-90 (“Amex’s competitors have exploited its higher
merchant fees to their advantage.”).
166 See Telser, supra note 156, at 91.
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card.167 As a result, free riding was not possible: AmEx was able to capture all
of the returns for its card user perks.168
In a clear assault on economics, and citing neither evidence nor argument,
the Court also held as a matter of law that a relevant market must be
identiﬁed in a vertical restraints case whether or not power was better proven
by direct means.169 The fact that all credit card transactions are digitized and
recorded indicates that direct proof from observations of demand responses
to price changes would be a superior device for assessing power in this
market. The Court’s statement of this position is regressive and discussed
none of the relevant literature or arguments.170
Finally, the Court stated an egregiously overgeneralized observation that
on two-sided platforms, harms on one side will be oﬀset by beneﬁts on the
other side.171 This amounts to assuming a conclusion of interest. In fact, the
anti-steering rule at issue in this case harmed both sides of the market, the
aﬀected card holders as well as the merchants, by denying them the ability to
make a more favorable deal.172 This was not Chicago School economics. It was
economic nonsense.
Apple Inc. v. Pepper reﬂects similar problems.173 In Illinois Brick v. Illinois,
which preceded Apple, the Supreme Court held that only customers who
purchase directly from a defendant can maintain a damages action under
Section 4 of the Clayton Act.174 The jurisprudence of Illinois Brick has focused
See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2304 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Platforms and the Rule of Reason: The American Express Case, 2019
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35, 65 (2019) (explaining that free riding was not possible because “Amex
rewards attach to specific transactions, not to mere possession of the card”).
169 The Court’s complete statement of this conclusion was contained in a single although
lengthy footnote:
167
168

The plaintiﬀs argue that we need not deﬁne the relevant market in this case because
they have oﬀered actual evidence of adverse eﬀects on competition—namely, increased
merchant fees. . . . We disagree. The cases that the plaintiﬀs cite for this proposition
evaluated whether horizontal restraints had an adverse eﬀect on
competition. . . . Given that horizontal restraints involve agreements between
competitors not to compete in some way, this Court concluded that it did not need to
precisely deﬁne the relevant market to conclude that these agreements were
anticompetitive. . . . But vertical restraints are diﬀerent. . . . Vertical restraints often
pose no risk to competition unless the entity imposing them has market power, which
cannot be evaluated unless the Court ﬁrst deﬁnes the relevant market.
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2285 n.7 (internal citations omitted).
170 Id.; Hovenkamp, supra note 168, at 50-52 (describing the Court’s explanation as a “confusing
statement [that] appears to do no more than assume the conclusion”).
171 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2288.
172 See Erik Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, 44 J. CORP. L. 713, 741 (2019) (“In every instance
in which a merchant is injured by the steering restraint, there must also be an injured cardholder.”).
173 Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
174 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 735 (1977).
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heavily on the diﬃculties of computing passed-on damages.175 Several states
have amended their antitrust laws so as to permit passed-on damages, and the
Supreme Court has permitted such statutes.176 The Apple majority, however,
ignored the passing on issue and looked only at the fact that the plaintiﬀs
paid money directly to the defendant.177 The dissenters also ignored the
economic issue. They concluded that Section 4 of the Clayton Act, which
gives a damages action to “any person who shall be injured in his business or
property,”178 contains an implicit “proximate cause” requirement that limits
damages to the ﬁrst purchaser in line.179 That view harkens back to premarginalist nineteenth century tort law that rejected the conception of
multiple causation in marginalist economics.180
Speaking even on those terms, however, the dissenters seemed not to
understand that the largest burden of the overcharge falls to the consumer, or
the last purchaser in line. Only they are not in a good position to pass
anything on.181 Indeed, many intermediaries suﬀer no overcharge injuries at
all because they operate under markup procedures that pass all costs on. That
is not to say that intermediaries are not injured; rather, their injury results
from reduced transaction volume, not from the overcharge. A rule that might
better compensate harmed parties is to give end users an overcharge cause of
action for their damages, and intermediaries an action for lost proﬁts
resulting from reduced sales.182
Neither AmEx nor the Apple dissent reﬂects sound economic analysis.183
They do represent a tortured eﬀort to limit liability even when sound and upto-date economics points in the other direction. While the Chicago critique
175 See, e.g., 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶¶ 346, 346(a) (“The Court was
concerned . . . with the problems of computing passing on, and the resulting potential for duplicative
recovery . . . .”). On the rationale of the decision in the economics of passing on, see William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws?
An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 602 (1979). On the complexities
giving rise to the Apple litigation, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Apple v. Pepper: Rationalizing Antitrust’s
Indirect Purchaser Rule, 120 COLUM. L. REV. F. 14 (2020).
176 See 14 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶ 2412(d) (summarizing state laws on
passed-on damages and Supreme Court treatment of those laws); see also California v. ARC Am.
Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105-06 (1989) (upholding state statutes allowing indirect purchasers to obtain damages).
177 Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1521 (“The absence of an intermediary is dispositive.”).
178 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2018).
179 Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1526-30 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
180 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 134-42 (discussing the evolving conception of proximate
cause in American jurisprudence).
181 See 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶ 346 (noting that intermediaries may
recover for their injury and the injury they pass on, whereas the consumer, frequently the “most
injured party,” typically does not have standing to recover).
182 See Hovenkamp, supra note 175, at 22 (proposing such a rule).
183 See Hovenkamp, supra note 37, at 2-3, 12 (arguing that Apple was “detached from the
economic issue” and AmEx was “economically incoherent”).
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properly ridiculed the inept economics of 1960s era antitrust decisions, the
AmEx decision and Apple dissent are not one whit better.
Finally, one area where the Chicago School recognized a serious threat of
competitive harm was in the use of government to create monopoly. Stigler’s
theory of regulation saw it principally as a form of private rent seeking rather
than a reasonable response to market failure.184 Bork’s work echoed this same
theme, speaking of predation through government process.185 Chicago School
antitrust writers, including both Bork and Posner, advocated aggressive use
of the antitrust laws in cases where the source of the restraint was government
action. When Bork was Solicitor General, he advocated a liability-expanding
“compulsion” requirement for antitrust’s “state action” doctrine.186 Posner
actually advocated that there be no state action antitrust immunity for actions
brought under the FTC Act.187
By contrast, the Harvard School position, as developed in the original
edition of the Antitrust Law treatise in 1978, rested on principles of
federalism. It sought to distinguish the actions of a legitimate government
decisionmaker from those taken at the behest of private entities. The Harvard
School position did not inquire into the merits of a regulation, but only into
its pedigree. The “state itself ” could authorize any regulation it wished,
provided that the authorization was clear. Private anticompetitive conduct
would be approved, however, only if it was “actively supervised” by a
government oﬃcial.188 In California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., the Supreme Court adopted this test virtually verbatim, and
it has governed the state action doctrine ever since.189
The Chicago School would clearly have embraced the majority opinion in
North Carolina Dental as an eﬀective use of antitrust law to combat stateapproved collusion. The dissenters suggested, however, that the case was an

See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
ROBERT H. BORK, Predation Through Governmental Processes, in THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX, supra note 16, at 347, 347-64.
186 See Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 616 (“[Bork’s] position was that an anticompetitive state
rule was immune from federal antitrust scrutiny only if the state actually compelled the private party
to act.”).
187 See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, 72 ANTITRUST L.J.
761, 770 (2005) (applauding FTC’s attempts to deny state action immunity to actions brought under
FTC Act).
188 See 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 213-214 (1978)
(proposing the state authorization and active supervision rules).
189 See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980)
(“These decisions establish two standards for antitrust immunity . . . . First, the challenged restraint
must be ‘one clearly articulated and aﬃrmatively expressed as state policy’; second, the policy must
be ‘actively supervised’ by the State itself.”) (citations omitted); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 11,
at 616-17 (discussing the adoption of the Harvard School position in Midcal).
184
185
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inappropriate attempt to interfere with a state scheme that was “not
structured in a way that merits a good-government seal of approval.”190
This switching of sides points to a motivation unrelated to the integrity
of Chicago School or any other economic theory. Its principal eﬀect is to
deliver proﬁts to those able to capture governmental processes.
“Opportunistic Economics” has too often deﬁned the approach of Chicago
School antitrust scholars when confronted with cases involving regulation
that limits competition.
C. The Chicago and Harvard Schools and Antitrust Welfare Tests
Neoclassical antitrust economics generally relied on a welfare “tradeoﬀ ”
conception that evaluated practices by netting out gains and losses.191 The
Williamson model of mergers, which traded oﬀ consumer losses against
productive eﬃciency gains, is a prime example.192 This conception of
economic welfare was historically controlling in both Harvard and Chicago
School economics literature, without signiﬁcant dissent, through most of the
heyday of the Harvard-Chicago debate.193 Bork adopted that model in the
late 1970s, but renamed it “consumer welfare.”194
One problem with implementing the welfare tradeoﬀ model is that it
requires cardinal (i.e., quantiﬁed) measurements of productive eﬃciency
gains and allocative eﬃciency losses—something courts cannot perform in
any but the clearest of circumstances.195 Disagreeing with Williamson, Bork
as well as Posner believed that eﬃciencies could not be measured in speciﬁc

190 N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 574 U.S. 494, 516 (2015) (Alito,
J., dissenting); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 615-16 (comparing Justice Alito’s position, “that
of a committed federalist,” to the position of the Chicago School).
191 See, e.g., J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696, 699 (1939)
(arguing that economic evaluation of gains and losses can guide policy choices to maximize social
welfare); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49
ECON. J. 549, 550 (1939) (discussing costs and compensation in the policymaking setting).
192 Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoﬀs, 58 AM.
ECON. REV. 18, 21-22 (1968) (examining the tradeoﬀ between cost savings and consumer losses).
193 See Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the Sherman Act:
How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659,
690 (2010) (describing how Chicago came to embrace the total welfare standard about a decade after
Harvard).
194 See BORK, supra note 16, at 105-08.
195 Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471,
2473-74 (2013) (describing the diﬃculties with a general welfare test in most cases); see also Herbert
Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Eﬃciencies, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 703, 733 (2017) [hereinafter
Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Eﬃciencies] (“Literal ‘balancing’ of competitive harms against
eﬃciency gains is virtually impossible.”).
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antitrust cases but must be presumed.196 The strength of that presumption
has wreaked havoc with sensible antitrust analysis of conduct, for it typically
entails that eﬃciencies will be presumed while harm, as outlined above,
requires strong proof.197
Another problem with the welfare tradeoﬀ model is that it permits output
reducing mergers if the gains to producers exceed the losses paid by
consumers. By Williamson’s own calculations, a relatively modest eﬃciency
gain from a merger would suﬃce to oﬀset a large price increase.198 Williamson
neglected to ask whether it is common that a merger both reduces output and
produces suﬃcient oﬀsetting eﬃciencies to make the merger welfare positive.
The typical merger that produces merger-speciﬁc marginal cost eﬃciencies
increases output as well.199 Under the consumer welfare principle that we
currently apply, merger eﬃciencies will only be accepted if they are suﬃcient
to hold the price to pre-merger levels, meaning that there is no relevant
welfare tradeoﬀ.200
Because protection of labor markets is a part of antitrust policy, higher
output is also beneﬁcial because it leads to competitive labor outcomes.
Mergers that increase buyer market power, including for labor, will suppress
wages.201 If those mergers create market power in the product market, they
may also decrease product output which itself reduces the demand for labor.202
In the original edition of the Antitrust Law treatise, Areeda and Turner
also adopted with no discussion a total welfare test for merger eﬃciencies.203
They also relied on Williamson and disagreed with Bork, arguing for strict
proof requirements for eﬃciency claims.204 Under their approach not only
must oﬀsetting merger-speciﬁc eﬃciencies be proven, but the defendant had

196 See BORK, supra note 16, at 107-10, 128-29; POSNER, supra note 109, at 112 (arguing that
eﬃciencies are practically impossible to measure); POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001), supra
note 151, at 13 (adhering to this position in 2001).
197 See supra note 160.
198 Williamson, supra note 192, at 22-23 (“[A] relatively modest cost reduction is usually
suﬃcient to oﬀset relatively large price increases even if the elasticity of demand is as high as 2,
which is probably a reasonable upper bound.”). Areeda and Turner note this with apparent approval.
See 4 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 188, ¶ 940, at 149 n.2 (1980).
199 See Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Eﬃciencies, supra note 195, at 709 (“Agencies . . . [agree]
that most mergers are socially beneficial because they lead to cost reductions or improved output . . . .”).
200 See id.
201 See Ioana Marinescu & Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Mergers in Labor Markets, 94
IND. L.J. 1031, 1035-36, 1038 (2019).
202 See id. at 1035-36, 1038 (describing how increased concentration can lead to coordinated
decreased output and wage suppression). Ordinarily such a merger will decrease the merging ﬁrms’
output; whether it results in higher prices depends on whether the ﬁrms have power in the output
market.
203 4 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 188, ¶ 940, at 149 & n.2 (1980).
204 Id.
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the burden of proof,205 with proof requirements that became quite stringent
as the merger’s anticompetitive potential loomed larger.206 The result is that
few defendants have succeeded in proving the requisite eﬃciencies. The
courts have generally followed this approach. Provable eﬃciencies must
produce lower marginal costs and therefore prices. Subsequent editions of
Antitrust Law largely abandoned the welfare tradeoﬀ statement of the
eﬃciencies defense, substituting a requirement that eﬃciencies must be
suﬃcient to preclude any price increase from occurring. This amounts to a
modiﬁed consumer welfare test and is the one incorporated in the current
(2010) Merger Guidelines.207
CONCLUSION
When economic policy takes the model of perfect competition as its
starting point, it has nowhere to go but downhill. If we did have a perfectly
competitive economy, then of course antitrust intervention would be
unnecessary. Faced with the choice of moving to models that provided greater
verisimilitude and predictability, but that required more intervention, or
clinging to the past, the Chicago School chose the latter. In the face of
contrary evidence, the Chicago School provided a set of tools that required
stringent proof burdens if only to prove the obvious, while accepting
eﬃciency claims without serious examination. Those who stood to gain from
this were ﬁrms with market power, at the expense of consumers and labor.
The result was one of the most complete cases of regulatory capture in
economic history, certainly far greater than any of the excesses of the New
Deal. Recent decisions such as AmEx and the Apple dissent suggest that at
least some Supreme Court Justices, unable to ﬁnd coherent economic
rationales for their positions, have abandoned antitrust economics altogether.

Id. ¶ 941, at 154.
Id. ¶ 962, at 197.
See 2010 HMG, supra note 89, § 10 (requiring an enforcement agency to “consider whether
cognizable eﬃciencies likely would be suﬃcient to reverse the merger’s potential to harm customers
in the relevant market”); see also 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, ¶¶ 971-973.
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